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The Impact of Shale Oil on the Middle East

Disclaimer: I wrote this essay a couple of years ago, and plan to refactor to make it easier to read online, as well as look back at it in perspective of what actually happened, to gauge how incorrect/correct I was.

One of the defining features of the 20th century (and the beginning of the 21st) was the vast impact of oil on geopolitics. Countries bombed each other and staged civil wars to achieve greater control over black gold. Typically, a war or some other event that had the potential to reduce the supply of oil has sent the price skyrocketing; at one point, the Brent Crude Index (the standard index to assess the price of oil) jumped 178% in the span of six months [1]. Contrast that to the recent drone attack on the Khurais and Abqaiq oil fields, which caused the price to jump by only 11.5% (from $61 to $68) a barrel, and it is clear that there has been a decline in oil price volatility. The reason: shale oil. This paper will analyze the impacts of shale oil on the middle east. It will cover how shale oil restricts oil volatility, its impact on the middle east and OPEC, and some of the global geopolitical implications of the rise of shale oil.

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[Figure 1] Brent Crude Index over time

Shale oil is a form of high-quality crude oil found in shale rock (it can also be found among other stone types, such as impermeable mudstone and siltstone). The oil itself is extracted in a process called hydraulic fracturing (fracking for short), wherein oil companies drill several miles deep into the ground. At that point, a metal tube is inserted into the hole and cement is poured on the sides, sealing the oil’s path to the surface from dirt or water. At this point, specialized machines drill another kilometer horizontally, and water (as well as other chemicals) is pumped in at a high pressure to fracture the shale rock ****(see figure 2).

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[Figure 2] Standard Shale Well Diagram

As a new technology, new methods are being created each year to improve the efficiency of the process, but currently the breakeven price for most shale oil operations stands at around $60 a barrel. Innovative methods, such as horizontal 25-split fracking, were discovered in 2009 and can reduce the price to $30 a barrel, but this requires even more specialized tools and depends on the concentration of oil in the land.

However, even at a price of $30 a barrel, shale oil is still relatively expensive produced (especially when compared to Saudi Arabia’s $10 per barrel). Conventional drilling is significantly cheaper than fracking, but costs much more to set up and takes a significant amount of time; between 5 and 10 years, compared to several months at most to setup a fracking facility.

This nature of system has significantly reduced volatility in the oil market. Due to the short amount of time it takes to develop fracking facilities, shale oil producers can quickly react to oil price increases and drill a much higher volume. This is done in order to capitalize on increased profits represented by the price increase, as the price to derive shale oil is constant. This floods the market with oil, which reduces demand, driving prices down. This has effectively put a lid on oil prices; if prices go up, oil floods the market, pushing them back down.

On the flip side, this has also kept a lower resistance to the price of oil: because shale oil costs a minimum of $30 a barrel to produce (not counting costs of equipment and setting up of facilities and drilling rights), even a somewhat low price represents financial unfeasibility. In the case of a dramatic drop in oil prices, fracking companies stop drilling (as it is no longer profitable) and store any reserves [2]. This, in effect, dramatically reduces supply, which sends the prices up. This can be seen right now with the current US petroleum production. In 2017, oil prices skyrocketed from $51 a barrel to a peak of $70.71 a barrel, representing a 756% increase in profitability at an average production price of $48 a barrel. As a result, the production of oil jumped from 15.6 million barrels per day in 2016 to 17.87 million barrels per day by the end of 2017.

This increase in production was one of the factors that caused the Brent Crude Index to tumble to $46.41 a barrel, thereby rendering shale oil entirely unprofitable. In turn, production dramatically decreased, and the production by the USA fell to 10.99 million barrels per day. This caused the price of oil to jump to $56.35 a barrel. Production is slowly ticking up again (currently at 12.6 million barrels per day), and the cycle continues.

This method of increasing or decreasing supply rapidly to reflect demand has naturally led to an overall diminishing of oil price volatility, keeping it between a lower resistance point (below which shale oil is unprofitable) and a higher resistance point (above which shale oil becomes very profitable causing companies to flood the market).

The effective elimination of significant volatility in oil price has resulted in widespread impacts in the middle east. Firstly, it reduces significantly the global impact of turmoil in the region, thereby eliminating one of the few key incentives global powers had to actively support peace plans. For example, when the Khurais and Abqaiq oil fields were attacked on September 14th, the Dow Jones Industrial average fell by 0.53%. To put this in perspective, when Kuwait (which has a total national output of 1.5 million barrels per day, almost 3.5x less than the amount eliminated by the September 2019 drone strikes) was invaded by Iraq in August 1990, the average fell by 14.04%. Even more telling than that is the fact that the Saudi drone strikes sent oil prices up by 14.7% [3]. The Kuwait invasion spiked the Brent Crude Index 40% [4]. It is, however, important to note that the Brent Futures Index [5] did increase by 19.5%, but the actual price increase was much lower.

Immediately after the drone strike on September 14th, 2019, many news outlets expected direct military retaliation by the Kingdom against Iran (who was accused of carrying out the strike by both the KSA and the USA, but currently denies any involvement). President Trump tweeted that he was prepared to strike back at Iran, and that the army was “locked and loaded.” However, no strike came, and the entire issue largely faded from the foreground.

This change in position lies in stark contrast to the previous US responses to aggression against an ally, such as Operation Desert Storm. Part of the reason analysts believe that the United States did not consider a military retaliation to be in its best interest was shale oil. The reduced volatility of global oil prices as a direct result of fracking practices meant that the US economy barely felt the impact of the strike (if at all, considering oil plummeted back to $58 a barrel a week after the strike, which was below the pre-strike price of $61).

This reduced volatility has directly reduced the importance of turmoil in the middle east and other oil rich regions to most, if not all, of the major global economies. The fact that there was no military retaliation to a drone strike on a Saudi oil field speaks volumes about the seismic shift in geopolitics that shale oil has caused.

The second impact of shale oil on the middle east can be determined by a deeper analysis of the Saudi drone strike and how it highlights the dramatic reduction in OPEC’s global influence. In order to analyze the effect of shale oil on OPEC’s power, we must first look at OPEC itself to understand what it is, why it was formed, and its historical power.

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting countries was founded in 1960, in Baghdad (Iraq). At the time, it had five members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The founding of the organization was the result of negotiations started by Venezuela dating back to 1949 [6]. At inception, OPEC produced almost 50% of the world’s oil. Its initial mission was to raise oil prices by eliminating the glut that had flooded global markets. Quotas proved successful, and OPEC dominated global oil production market share, rising to account for almost 68% of global oil production.

One of OPEC’s first global moves was instating an Arab oil embargo in response to the increasing support for Israel. Countries friendly to the Zionist state were refused oil from members of the energy cartel, and oil prices rose from $25.97 per barrel to $46.35 per barrel in the span of six months.

OPEC continued to dominate the oil markets for several decades, holding between 60 and 70% of market share at any given time (see figure 3). And then came shale oil.

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[Figure 3] Depiction of global oil market share of major groups between 1970 and 1997

As of current, OPEC’s standing has dropped dramatically to 44% (a reduction of 36% from their peak market share). Along with their dramatic market share decline is a dramatic decline in power and influence.

As seen previously, OPEC had the power to dramatically raise oil prices by lowering output quotas. However, due to the nature of shale oil (especially how fast it can be set up), the latest OPEC quota cut was met with an equal increase in US production [7].

This was an unprecedented power move by the US, and one that could not have been played had it not been for shale oil. As a result, some of the largest OPEC members are scrambling to setup damage control. Both Saudi Arabia and Venezuela have lowered output enough to bring OPEC’s total output to a four-year low [8].

Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s largest member (see figure 4), is defying cartel policy by engaging in negotiations with Russia (classified as a spectator by OPEC) for an oil supply deal. Saudi Arabia is by far OPEC’s largest member, and the fact that they are openly undermining the organization is huge. In the words of Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh, it “threatens the existence of OPEC.” In reality, this is simply the byproduct of the massive rise of shale oil. In the words of Investopedia’s Rakesh Sharma (an analyst with 8+ years of experience) “Historically, OPEC’s production cuts had devastating effects on global economies. Although still influential, OPEC's influence on prices has diminished with the U.S. now a top oil producer”.

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[Figure 4] Chart depicting oil production percentage by country as of 2018

OPEC’s woes are being exacerbated by a fresh oil glut, according to another article by Forbes [9]. All of this has compounded and the financial world seems to be taking notice; Qatar left OPEC in 2018, and The Economist wrote a bold article about it under the title, “A Cartel Busts Itself.” To be entirely fair, it isn’t all doom and gloom for the oil cartel, at least in the short term. OPEC does control approximately 72% of the world’s crude oil reserves, and in a worst scenario could starve the world of its precious black gold. However, this would be met with a dramatic rise of oil prices and be unwise from a long-term perspective, as it would further encourage expansion of shale oil.

Shale oil is a new technology, but it has had a widespread impact. In the middle east, it has resulted in significantly diminished global response to turmoil. It also seems to be leading to the collapse of one of the most influential players in the middle east, namely OPEC. These are just some of the impacts that shale oil is bringing on the global scale.

Continuing the vein of implications of the rise of shale oil leads to the third point of this paper; geopolitical implications of the collapse of OPEC are widespread to say the least. The foremost of this will likely be the further straining of sectarian tensions in the middle east. Historically, the middle east has been split along racial and sectarian lines. Looking at the region since even the inception of Islam (the principal religion of the area) gives a clear picture of this. From the Arab conquest of Iran (also known as the Muslim invasion of Persia [10], to the Iran-Iraq war [11], to the suppression of Shiite Muslims in the Omayyad and Abbasid dynasties, as well as the Ottoman empire[ [12], to the slaughter of Shiite Muslims in Pakistan, and more recently, by ISIS, it is clear that sectarian and racial tensions have played a major role in the history of the middle east.

In recent times, racial tensions have simmered (although they do still appear, such as in the 1990’s war between Arab Iraq and Persian Iran [14]. Instead, sectarian tensions have become more prominent, and can be seen all over the middle east. Examples include the open murder of Shiite Muslims by the Sunni extremist groups (such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), and the split of factions on sectarian lines in various civil wars (such as Syria). The biggest sectarian divide in the middle east remains between Iran (with a staggering 90% Shiite majority) and Saudi Arabia (which hosts a 75-85% Sunni majority). The two sides have long engaged in a cold war of sorts, arming and funding proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and many other middle eastern countries. OPEC has, in a large part, kept these two countries from engaging in open war.

Small bouts do occur, such as the sacking of the Saudi embassy in Iran after the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr by the Saudi government, or more notably the Khurais and Abqaiq drone strikes, which Saudi maintains was executed by the Iranians (as previously mentioned). However, these skirmishes are controlled and while tensions run high, both sides are yet to engage in direct fire.

Analysts peg the main reasons for this as twofold: firstly, because they are two of the largest members of OPEC, it would be in their best interests not to go to war; a split within OPEC could mean slashing of oil prices by both parties in order to undercut each other’s sales. However, this would inevitably lead to reduced profit and would result in economic consequences for both the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom.

Secondly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have the ability to disrupt the oil flow of the other country, thereby starving it from its profit and easily sending it into recession. The reason for this is the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow stretch of water that separates the UAE and Iran (see figure 5). A third of all the world’s oil passes through the area, and eliminating that flow, even for a day, poses the threat of a global recession or even depression [14]. This mutually assured destruction of sorts has kept the two regional powers from going to war. However, if both Iran and Saudi Arabia have a guarantee by which the price of oil is stabilized, and a generally secure method of selling oil, they will inevitably go to war.

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[Figure 5] The Strait of Hormuz

This is unfolding in front of our eyes: the strait of Hormuz is slowly losing importance as both Saudi and Iran develop more mainland pipelines. One could argue that this was a major reason as to why Iran authorized the attack against Saudi refining facilities [15]. The last line of defense that is keeping the middle east from collapsing is OPEC, but if it falls, one could argue that there is nothing standing in the way of a war in the middle east.

The second major geopolitical implication of the rise of shale oil is a shift in the global power balance. For the past two decades, much of the world’s focus has been on the turmoil in the middle east. A large reason behind this was due to the fact that almost all of the global oil production was situated there. Natural gas is one of the leading factors that impact the global economy, and hence its movements were naturally scrutinized.

The rise of shale oil has effectively destroyed OPEC’s power by eliminating its ability to influence global geopolitics by affecting oil prices. This has led to a shift on global positions and power. For starters, many oil rich countries have much less sway than they used to. For example, the US has historically avoided sanctioning Iran’s oil sales, so as to not disrupt global supply. However, they have since become the largest supplier, and their massive reserve and ability to produce shale oil is cited as one of the reasons why they have now imposed sanctions with the intention of bringing Iran’s oil exports down to zero.

Historic status quos are being broken; after many years of internal stability in Iran, protests now rock the country[16]. Saudi Arabia has turned away from its ally, the United States, to broker an oil deal with Russia on behalf of another cartel, dubbed OPEC+ (which includes many of the oil producing countries not part of OPEC). Interestingly, the result of the deal was a curbing of oil output, something that would benefit the Saudis in the short-term, but would continue to expand the influence of shale oil in the long term.

As middle eastern influence fades, Russia and China have stepped in, both looking to producing their own shale oil (see figure 6). However, at least for the short term, North American influence in the global sphere will certainly deepen as a result of their massive edge in the global oil market.

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[Figure 6] Projected oil percentage output

Another impact of research money being poured into alternative sources of energy (other than the development of fracking) has been biofuels and other renewable energy sources. As of current, biofuels account for approximately 9% of unconventional supply growth, but this is expected to rise to 23% between 2020 and 2030.

All of this together points to a large geopolitical shift. Shale oil kickstarted the destruction of OPEC (and with it, the status quo of middle eastern economic influence), which has resulted in a modern-day race to develop new methods of harvesting energy.

No doubt, the winner(s) of this race will hold massive sway over the global economy and are likely to be the next global superpower. Shale oil is still in its infancy, but its rise points to large global geopolitical impacts in the form of reduced middle eastern influence, increased energy production competition, and the destruction of historic status quos and alliances as conventional oil-producing countries try to survive.

In conclusion, the rise of shale oil has brought on many consequences. It has reduced oil volatility dramatically, wiped out the influence of conventional oil cartel OPEC, and has sparked an energy race that has begun to redraw global geopolitics. The face of energy is changing, and by extension so will trends in the global economy. It is uncertain how the middle east will change as a result of reduced cashflow and influence, or how the global economy will shift as a result of reduced oil volatility, but one thing is clear: the world is changing, and time will tell how much.

Footnotes

[1] Attributed to the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo in response to rising support for Israel.

[2] There are businesses that are based on using calculus and oil tank shadows from satellite to estimate reserve amounts and predict the price of oil

[3] The most purported increase. It is important to note that the other leading index, the WTI, went up by 14.6%. Also note that this was the largest day spike, but it fell back down within the week, while the fall caused by the Kuwait invasion lasted three weeks and took over six months to fully recover. The time delay in market reaction can be attributed to less robust communication methods at the time.

[4] Value calculated directly from US government records fated August 1st 1990 through August 23rd, 1990

[5] A speculative index tracking expected future oil prices, not to be confused with the Brent Crude Index.

[6] The initial priority was stabilizing oil prices after WW2. Interestingly, the process only made a headway when multinational oil companies posted a unilateral 10% reduced to middle east light crude.

[7] Forbes published an article on this, entitled “OPEC is not dead yet, but it has lost control of the oil market.” This article was a bold move, especially by an organization as reputable as Forbes, which notably did not add a disclaimer that the view was solely that of the author.

[8] As of April 2019. Note that analysts still peg the majority of lost Venezuelan output a consequence of US sanctions.

[9] Entitled OPEC slides closer to collapse as an oil glut threatens to overpower oil price. Published September 13th, 2019.

[10] Because almost all of the Muslims at the time were Arab, the war was in essence one of Arabs against Persians. Anti Persian sentiments and even much after the conquest, Persians were considered inferior to Arabs. The invasion was executed by the Rashidun caliphate by the third Sunni caliph Omar, led by infamous general Khalid Bin Walid (dubbed the “Saif-Ullah”, or “Sword of God” by Sunni Muslims), and may have led to the slavery of many Persians in the Islamic Empire.

[11] One of the reasons that Israel trained Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war may have been due to a united enmity towards Arabs. Note that it is more likely that it was simply out of desperation on Iran’s part due to the toll that the war was taking on the nation, which had just been through a revolution that saw the collapse of the military structure.

[12] Note that there was a brief period of harmony between Shiite and Sunni Islamic sects during the decline of the Ottoman empire as they allied against a common enemy, namely secular colonists.

[13] While obviously not the only factor, race is cited as a major factor in the Iran-Iraq war.

[14] An interesting article on this is one titled ‘Strait of Hormuz closure would be catastrophic’ by Turkey’s Anadolu Agency (a news agency).

[15] Saudi Arabia, which is currently engaged in a war with Yemen’s Shiite Houthi rebels, had all of their missile detection systems facing southward. This is one of the major reasons why they did not pick up on the incoming drones, and it is also the primary reason why analysts blame Iran for the attack.

[16] More recently, three members of the IRGC were killed by Iranian rioters near the capital Tehran.

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